The EU’s impact on the Greek welfare state: Europeanization on paper?

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Summary For the past 25 years in Greece, welfare-state reforms have been the result of the interplay between domestic politics and European influences. While pension reform has been aborted, some targeted and small-scale reforms have proven more successful. Wholesale changes of the welfare system have met with strong resistance from private interests and bureaucratic mechanisms. The EU’s impact has mostly been felt in the policies of employment, vocational training, regional development and, less so, social assistance. Other welfare-state reforms have remained mostly on paper. However, the Greek welfare regime is gradually undergoing a cognitive change, manifested in the diffusion of social rights, and has adopted EU-driven policy tools for consultation and decision making. Throughout, path dependence has interacted with reform dynamics, flowing from the country’s integration into the EU.

Key words Europeanization, Greece, policy tools, social-policy shifts

Introduction

The little research that exists on the Europeanization of the Greek welfare state has claimed that the impact of the EU has been auxiliary but complex. There are two views on this. The first view states that:

EU-level coordination might have exerted some influence in the form of adding impetus to the Greek reform efforts . . . the Europeanization of Greek social policy has not led to welfare state retrenchment. (Andreou and Koutsiras, 2002: 166–67)
The second view, which refers to Greece and Spain in comparative perspective, states that:

On the one hand, joining the EU has had the effect of fostering the expansion of social policies in order to close the existing gap with other European welfare states. On the other hand . . . the EMU has facilitated the use of blame-avoidance strategies acting as vincolo esterno. (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000: 140–1)

Both views correctly point out that, in contrast to other European cases, in Greece the decade of the 1990s was not associated with a retrenchment of the welfare state. In 1994–2003, under socialist party (PASOK) rule, social expenditure rose compared to the
period of 1990–93 when the conservative
party (ND) was in power (data of the
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Table
1). Moreover, the socialist Government of C.
Simitis (1996–2003) has spent on social
expenditure as much as the first socialist gov-
ernment of A. Papandreou (1981–89) and
more than the latter’s second Government in
1993–96. On average, per year, social expen-
diture in 1996–2003 was 20.1 percent of the
GDP, whereas in 1981–89 it was 19.8 percent.
Social expenditure today is above 22
percent of the GDP (Table 1; 26 percent com-
pared to the EU average of 28 percent, if we
use ESSPROS data). By the beginning of this
century, Greece had finally caught up with the
West in terms of ‘welfare effort’. This too is an
aspect of Europeanization of the welfare state:
social expenditure has risen to EU standards.

Such differences between Greece and other
EU member states may be understood in the
context of specific domestic political and
administrative factors and concrete social
class interests. Relevant political factors are
the persistence of a very conflictual political
culture, the intense bipolar character of the
Greek party system and the organizational
deficiencies of the Greek welfare administra-
tion. Concrete social class interests, however,
include public-sector employees and liberal
professionals. For different reasons, such
employees and professionals have defended a
very unequal system of social protection
demarcating ‘insiders’, who are beneficiaries
of ‘noble’ social security funds, and ‘out-
siders’, who participate in much less well-
endowed funds. The situation is similar with
medical school professors, unions of public-
hospital employees and investors in private
health care who, again for different reasons,
have resisted any substantive change in health-
care provision since 1983, when the Greek
National Health Service (ESY) was founded.

Our argument is that, as a result of the
above factors, continuity rather than change
characterizes the way the Greek welfare
system is financed and the way it dispenses
social transfers, which have not changed since
at least 1982 (Table 3). Reforms related to
these aspects have remained on paper. Using
the concepts of Pierson (1994), we may say
that the fundamental structure of the Greek

Table 2  Selected indicators of the Greek welfare state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greece (%) of GDP</th>
<th>EU 15 (%) of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a Social expenditure data are drawn on the basis of ESSPROS system of social protection statistics, not
on the national social budget.
b ‘S80/S20’ denotes the ratio of income earned by the top quintile over the bottom quintile.
Source: Matsaganis et al. (2003: 641, Table 1), based on European Commission (2002).
A welfare regime has remained comparably stable and that existing commitments have locked-in policymakers. However, there is more change in the policy tools used and in the content of policies related to labour markets, employment, vocational training, regional development and, less so, social assistance. In these policy domains, changes have not remained on paper. Owing to the growing integration of Greece into the EU, reform has prevailed over institutional legacies in the way social policy is formulated and in the subject matter of some, but not all, policy areas.

In this article we will not discuss all aspects of Europeanization which, according to the relevant literature, involves the impact of EU dynamics on national politics and policy making, discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). We will make a distinction between the Europeanization of policy making (including the corresponding impact of the EU on discourse, i.e. cognitive Europeanization), on the one hand, and the Europeanization of the substance of policies, on the other hand.

In the following section of this article, we will briefly sketch some components of an emerging model of welfare in the EU and the components of the Greek welfare state. Next, we will contrast domestic and EU influences on Greek social policies between 1981 and today. In the main body of the article, we will briefly discuss the EU’s impact on policy tools and the content of six policy areas. In the last section, we will trace the causes of the traditional Greek welfare regime’s relative resilience.

### An emerging ‘European social model’ and the Greek welfare state

There seems to be an emerging European social model. A recent version of the model includes six ‘policy headlines’ (Commission of the EC, 2003: 12–22):

- the creation of more and better jobs
- a new balance between individual security and flexibility
- the fight against poverty and social exclusion
- the linking of economic performance with solidarity
- the promotion of gender equality
- the strengthening of social policy aspects of East European enlargement.

The above headlines are a set of norms, reflecting the Lisbon Strategy, set out in 2000, to create out of the current EU a competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy. The norms are diffused not so much through rigid regulation, as through softer channels, such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).

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**Table 3** Social benefits by group of functions (as % of total social benefits) in Greece, in 1982, 1987 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Old age + survivors</th>
<th>Sickness/health care</th>
<th>Family and children</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Other*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: `Other` includes ‘one-off’ or extraordinary allowances and other social care expenses (for which data are unavailable for 1982 and 1987).

We may say that the Greek welfare state stands at the crossroads between the traditional South European welfare model (Ferrera, 1996) and the gradually emerging European social model.

Of course, Greek political elites and society interpret the model variably, as other national elites and societies do. For instance, since the late 1940s elites have followed a developmentalist ideology, so that Greece would ‘catch up’ with the West (Mouzelis, 1978; Guillén and Álvarez, this issue). In the 1970s and 1980s, even before there was talk of a European social model, for some Greeks the concept of Europeanization of welfare meant a growth of social expenditure with the aim of achieving West European living standards. In the late 1990s, more in line with the rest of the EU, for some people this concept meant more effective social protection against unemployment and the risks of old age.

Shifts in perceptions have not been accompanied by structural shifts away from the traditional characteristics of the Greek welfare system. These are fragmentation and clientelism in the funding and delivery of social protection, leading to large-scale inequities; predominance of cash benefits over other kinds of transfers or services; and preponderance of pensions among all cash benefits (Table 2 and Petmesidou, 1996; Symeonidou, 1996; Ifandopoulos, 2002). The Greek National Health System (ESY) is based on general taxation, while social security is organized along occupational lines and funded by contributions. Acting as a collective patron in the area of social policy, the Greek state has selectively benefited the insurance funds of specific occupational groups (the so-called ‘noble’ funds). Beneficiaries, who are ‘insiders’ of the social-security system, include certain liberal professions and high-status occupations (engineers, lawyers, doctors, journalists) and the employees of corporations of the wider public sector. Throughout the postwar period, the Greek state has put employees of the private sector, self-employed workers, and women in general in a disadvantaged position (Sotiropoulos, 2003). These are the ‘outsiders’ who have not benefited from the clientelist distribution of welfare privileges. This clientelist legacy has not changed dramatically since Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981.

The pre- and immediate post-accession phase

The transition from the colonels’ regime in 1974 fuelled demands not only for political democracy, but also for higher living standards. Pressures from below – i.e. from workers, farmers and employees of the public sector – mounted. Political rights, re-established after the interlude of the military junta (1967–74), were now accompanied by social rights, recognized in the constitution of 1975. Accession to the EEC was fiercely debated, and the Greek state and economy were not particularly prepared to enter the EEC. Pre-accession social policies were not linked to such a prospect.

In October 1981, a major government turnover took place, as the socialist party (PASOK) came to power. The Greek political system shifted to the Left, after the seven-year military dictatorship and the seven-year rule of the conservative party (ND, 1974–81). PASOK stayed in power until 1989, and the largest part of the 1980s was characterized by welfare expansion. The impact of the 1981 accession on the Greek welfare state was minimal. Although some regulations – such as Regulation 1612/1968 (concerning equality of pay, unionization rights, etc.) – were to become immediately effective, in practice Greece was granted a long period of adaptation to the EEC. For instance, for Greeks seeking work in EEC countries, labour mobility would not become effective until 1988 (Provopoulos, 1987: 45).

PASOK’s rise to power marked a quantitative shift in social policy. On average, annual social expenditure as a share of GDP rose from around 14 percent under ND (1975–81) to 20 percent under PASOK (1982–89) (Table 1). In the 1980s, the socialist Government practised
redistribution: it ignored fiscal constraints and satisfied popular demands in a cumulative manner, which could not be sustained in the long run (Kazakos, 2001: 158). Increases in social spending reflected the composition of PASOK’s electoral base. PASOK rose to power on the shoulders of a large social-class coalition, which included the petite bourgeoisie (artisans, craftsmen, farmers, shopkeepers), the new middle class (public-sector employees, liberal professionals) and the working class. One of the first measures of the socialist/populist Government was to increase the very low agricultural pension by 100 percent and the minimum wage and minimum pension in the private sector by 40 percent (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000: 135). In other words, in Greece the expansion of the welfare state was not linked to the country’s integration into the EEC so much as to a drive to catch up with the West. The drive included a long period of economic adaptation during which Greece became a service-oriented economy, witnessed Greek migrants return from Western Europe, and after 1989 experienced a large inflow of migrants from South-Eastern Europe.

In the 1980s, the rise in social expenditure was not accompanied by structural changes in the social-security system. By contrast, major changes took place in family policy and in the public-health system. In 1982, PASOK changed the family law, by amending the relevant section of the Greek Civil Code, in order to promote gender equality. In 1983, the socialist Government founded the Greek National Health System. Although the establishment of a nationwide public-health system, including a network of local health centres (‘Kentra Hygieneias’), was a major achievement of PASOK, the emergence of ESY did not lead to the eclipse of occupational health schemes. Meanwhile, doctors joined the public-health sector and also continued their private practices. In health care, there was a collusion of public and private interests which fostered extensive corruption (Petmesidou, 2000: 303, 310; Carpenter, 2003; Mossialos and Davaki, forthcoming).

The 1990s

Increased social spending, along with high defence spending (owing to persisting tensions with Turkey), strained public finances. Greece’s public debt had already started increasing in the 1970s, under ND rule. It soared in the 1980s, under PASOK rule. Since then, Greek public finances have never really recovered. The debt was around 125 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s and still hovered at around 100 percent in 2001 (Petmesidou, 2000: 306; Tinios, 2003: 198–9). During the short-term rule of ND (1990–93), the EEC warned against the continuation of the economic policies of the 1980s. In 1990–93, social expenditure fell by one percentage point in comparison with the 1981–89 period (Table 1). A measure of the conservative government was to streamline the pension system: it passed two laws on the pension system (in 1990 and in 1992), bringing about parametric rather than structural changes to the system. The original drafts of laws were modified after strong opposition by the trade unions, the leadership of which represented the interests of the ‘insiders’ of the system.

Pension reform under ND was not so much the outcome of the country’s integration into the EEC as the result of fiscal constraints. These were due to the country’s huge public debt. The results of the 1990–92 reform were mixed. Finances improved, but the basic structure of social protection was left untouched. Low-income pensioners suffered losses; the so-called ‘noble’ occupational funds did not suffer as much. The new laws passed by ND required higher contributions from those who entered the labour market after 1993. Consequently, the financial burden of offering social protection to older generations of insured people was passed on to younger and also to future generations of employees.

After PASOK’s comeback to power in 1993, a shift towards more strict macro-economic policies became apparent. The shift was more clear after 1996, when Simitis succeeded Papandreou as prime minister of the socialist
government. Simitis was keen not only on conforming, but also on contributing to the shaping of EU strategies and policies. Change was reflected more in the Greek government’s tools than in the substance of its policy making. We will first summarize the former and then move to the latter.

The Europeanization of social policy tools

The rise of Simitis (a modernizing social democrat) to power, combined with the impact of the EU, brought about changes in the way social policy is formulated and monitored in Greece. Europeanization can be traced in the emergence of four policy tools.

Neo-corporatist structures of consultation among social partners

In the second half of the 1990s, systematic rounds of consultation took place between the government and nationwide representatives of employers and employees. Relevant ‘committees of social dialogue’ on employment and pensions were formed in 1997. The results of ‘social dialogue’ were not impressive, as participants eventually kept to their original positions, while the products of the dialogue were a set of non-binding statements. The intermediation between the government, which envisaged major reforms in the welfare state, and labour representatives was not a cosmetic exercise, but did not bear any fruits either. Reform through consensus building was an attempted strategy which remained on paper.

However, two cognitive changes are worth mentioning. First, the discourse of labour representatives was remarkably different from the past (Kioukias, 2003: 28). In the 1970s and 1980s, labour leaders used to argue on ideological terms. By contrast, in the late 1990s they were ready to furnish evidence and use the language of expertise, for instance drawing on empirical research conducted by the Labour Institute (INE) associated with the peak labour association (GSEE – General Confederation of Workers of Greece). Second, for the Greek system of industrial relations, which used to be an idiosyncratic case of state corporatism functioning within a democratic political regime, the aforementioned tripartite consultation was a step in the long process of transition to neo-corporatism (Kioukias, 2003).

The above changes have not altered the traditional neglect shown by the Greek state towards the funds of the less ‘noble’ occupational categories, such as self-employed workers, employees and manual workers in the private sector. The latter two categories are less well represented in the higher organs of peak confederations of labour. The occupational origins of labour representatives (who are mostly public-sector employees and belong to the ‘noble’ funds) explains – to some extent – the inability of the new structure of interest intermediation to cover the distance between the government’s plans and the social partners’ interests. The same fact explains the fierce resistance put up by peak confederations of labour to PASOK’s aborted pension reforms of 1998 and 2001.

Expert committees

In Greece there is a tradition of constituting ad hoc committees, the product of which ends up in a remote filing cabinet and remains unused. Typical examples were a short-lived committee on social-security reform, formed by Minister G. Gennimatas in the mid-1980s, and the Experts’ Committee on public-health reform in the early 1990s.

The difference with the committees constituted under Simitis in 1997–2000 was that the latter reflected a comprehensive concept of reform, envisaged to simultaneously cover labour markets, industrial relations and the social-security system. The committees were formed under initiatives taken by the prime minister himself, rather than individual ministers, and were coordinated by the same person.
(Professor John Spraos, whose name the committees bore). In contrast to the past, main recommendations of these committees were submitted to public debate. The scope and systematic character of such committees is another instance of Europeanization. The committees reflected the influence of the EC’s White Paper of 1993 and the Luxembourg process, which emphasized the coordination of economic and social policies.

**New institutions**

The foundation of new institutions may be seen in the same context. Drawing on EU funds, the government created new staff and line-administrative hierarchies which would be more flexible than the sprawling central services of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Examples included the Organization of Education and Vocational Training (OEEK, founded in 1992), the Economic and Social Committee (OKE, founded in 1994) and the National Organization of Social Care (EOKF, founded in 1998).

New policy tools at the regional level included Regional Operational Programmes, Local Employment Action Plans, Integrated Local Interventions and Developmental Pacts (in the context of the EU initiative EQUAL). The government reformed the Greek Employment Agency (OAED) and founded local centres for the promotion of employment (in 2002 there were 60 such centres). The motive behind these new institutions was not only the level of unemployment (11.1 percent in 2000 and 10.2 percent in 2001), but also the fact that Greece has one of the lowest rates of labour force participation in the EU: in 2001, overall employment was 55.4 percent in contrast to the EU average of 64.9 percent (Council of the European Union, 2003: 124). The evolution of new institutions was variable. For instance, the regional decentralization of the Economic and Social Committee (OKE), albeit provided by law, has never really materialized. Regional branches (NOKE) of the Committee were to be created at the level of prefectures (‘nomarchies’), but no funds or personnel were allocated to this task (Kioukias, 2003: 129). This decentralization was effected only on paper.

The National Organization of Social Care (EOKF) was understaffed in the first four years of its existence. Three old social-care organizations which, according to the founding law of EOKF (passed in 1998) should have merged into EOKF, managed to survive as independent units. In early 2003, under a new law, social-care competencies were transferred to regional authorities. EOKF was transformed into a ‘National Council for Social Care’ (ESYKF), i.e. into a wider framework structure.

The importance of the aforementioned new institutions has been more evident at the cognitive level than that of social-policy formulation or implementation. The institutions have contributed to the socialization of welfare administrators and social partners into the logic of EU-driven social policies (see Guillén and Álvarez and also Lendvai, this issue, for similar conclusions about Spain and Eastern Europe). The socialization involved the diffusion of extended social rights, including gender equality and rights related to the hygiene and safety of working conditions, as well as the rationalization of social policies. After decades of haphazard decision making in social affairs, in Greece – thanks to the requirements of European integration – stress was now put on: setting measurable targets; absorbing earmarked funds within reasonable time limits; following up the implementation of legislated policies; and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of attempted measures.

Cognitive change did not happen overnight, just because of Greece’s integration into the EU. The functions of the aforementioned new institutions were not shaped at the time of their creation. They were constantly redefined, depending on the flow of funds, on the waver- ing political support the institutions enjoyed from cabinet ministers, and on the ‘fit’ between the new institutions and the old
public organizations and central services of ministries. For instance, two practically antagonistic institutions, the National Observatory of Employment (EPA) and the National Foundation of Employment (EIE), which in the 1990s simultaneously monitored labour-market developments, were merged into one institution in 2001.

National Action Plans

After the adoption of the European Employment Strategy, each member state devised a ‘National Action Plan’ for employment. The Greek government produced four National Action Plans for employment in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. It also devised two National Action Plans on social inclusion in 2001 and 2003 and a national strategy for the reform of the pension system. However, only a systematic and comparative evaluation of past plans, which is beyond the scope of this article, would allow us to grasp setbacks encountered in their implementation. For instance, it is telling that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which is in charge of the Plans, has encountered difficulties in mobilizing the rest of the state apparatus for the implementation of plans. Nevertheless, importing the logic of coordinated planning from the EU has marked a significant shift in the programming and monitoring of Greek social policy.

The Europeanization of social policy areas

Successive Greek governments have followed a course of action in various social policy areas, which looked like a meander. Formal collective agents – such as the central bank of Greece, involved ministries and public bodies, and the courts – pushed policy shifts in directions other than those originally intended by the government. In this section, the interplay of domestic interests and EU pressures is shown through examples from six different policy areas.

Labour markets and employment

Over the last 30 years, three changes stand out in the Greek labour market: the decrease in the share of the agricultural labour force in total employment (16 percent of the Greek labour force worked in agriculture in 2001, down from 30 percent in 1980; currently the EU average is 4 percent); the entry of women into the labour market (48.8 percent of Greek women worked in 2001, compared to the EU average of 60 percent); and the in-flow of foreign migrants, who currently comprise between 10 percent and 20 percent of the Greek labour force.

However, the structural characteristics of the Greek labour market have remained roughly the same (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002: 108, Table 1; Lyberaki, 2003: 5–6). Overall employment participation is still low (55.4 percent in 2003); the percentage of self-employed people is high (32 percent of total employment in 2001, compared to the EU average of 15 percent); the informal economy employs a rather large share of total employment; unemployment remains high (9 percent in 2003, down from 12 percent in 1999); and part-time work is still unusual (5 percent of total employment). While total employment increased in 1994–2003 (by 6 percent in total), it has not followed the rapid pace of economic growth (on average 3.7 percent annual growth in 1997–2000, 4 percent in 2003).

In order to follow EU guidelines on labour-market reform, the Greek government has introduced new legislation and has also determined certain policy tools (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2002: 229–32, 239–41). Measures included incentives to employers to decrease overtime work by increasing overtime pay; and to hire new personnel by decreasing social-security contributions in the case of low-paid workers and by decreasing the taxation rate on corporate profits (from 40 percent to 35 percent); as well as incentives to those seeking part-time employment, by increasing compensation for part-time jobs. The 2003 National
Action Plan for Employment aims at encouraging and spreading part-time work, expanding the child-support infrastructure and decreasing gender inequalities.

Since the late 1990s, labour-market and employment policies in Greece have clearly shown the impact of EU. There has been a vast mobilization of personnel, funds and other resources to meet EU requirements. Owing to pressures from the EU, the new policies have opened up opportunities for Greek women, the young and the unemployed. Overall, institutional legacies have given ground to new dynamics emanating from the EU’s concern with employment promotion.

The pension system

The impact of the EU is not as visible in pension policy, an area in which, until recently, institutional legacies continued to play a major role. In the postwar period, the state used to closely monitor the financial management of the pension funds to the point of obliging the funds to deposit their reserves in the central bank (Bank of Greece) at low interest rates. When in deficit, funds were obliged to borrow from state-run banks on unfavourable terms (Petmesidou, 2000: 320, 327; Vourloumis, 2002: 89). This practice was partially changed in 1994, when a new law was passed allowing the funds greater discretion in the use of their financial resources. However, four years later, a special board was established by the Bank of Greece to supervise investments by the pension funds. The shift towards more autonomy of fund management did not remain on paper, but was partially reversed.

The government of Simitis introduced a pension supplement (EKAS) in 1996, in order to support low-income pensioners. This was a targeted, means-tested social assistance measure. In the same vein, another means-tested benefit was targeted at families with many children earning below a certain level of annual income. However, the highest administrative court struck down this measure. As a consequence, even well-to-do families became entitled to the benefit. The Simitis government also proceeded with the transformation of the farmers’ pension fund (OGA) from a general taxation-based fund to a contributions-based fund (Petmesidou, 2000: 320). In December 1998, the government also attempted the so-called ‘mini-reform’ of pensions. The thrust of this reform was twofold: first, the unification of pension funds and, second, the imposition of stricter rules for awarding benefits to pensioners and their survivors. Only some debt-ridden supplementary funds were merged into IKA (Social Security Foundation – the largest fund covering the private sector), and a new unified supplementary fund for public employees was founded (Petmesidou, 2000: 319–20). The unification of three funds of self-employed workers (TEVE of artisans and small shopkeepers, TAE of merchants and TSA of taxi drivers and owners of transport vehicles) was officially provided by the reform. This would have been a major change for the total of 800,000 persons insured in the three funds. A new fund was founded in order to absorb these funds. However, in early 2003, four years into the ‘mini’ reform, each fund still preserved its administrative and financial autonomy from the new larger fund (Tinios, 2003: 33). In this respect, the projected reform has remained on paper.

After winning general elections once more in 2000, Simitis set out to reform the pension system (Featherstone et al., 2001; Matsaganis, 2002a; Triantafillou, 2003; Venieris, 2003). Based on a report on the Greek system, drafted by experts from the British Government Actuaries Department, the government announced a wholesale reform in the spring of 2001 (the Giannitsis Reform, called after the name of the competent minister). The reform imposed lower replacement rates along with higher age thresholds for retirement; provided for the merger of many funds to several new, socio-professional schemes; and distributed the financial costs of the system among all categories of insured persons, including the rela-
tively well-protected employees of public corporations. However, upon the announcement of the reform, a sort of social revolt erupted. All confederations of workers and employees and the mass media challenged the reform as a neo-liberal attack on pension rights, leading to retrenchment of the welfare state. Massive demonstrations shook Athens. The government was obliged to take the reform back.

A second attempt at a watered-down reform was made in 2002 (the Reppas Reform). This reform had to do only with the pensions of employees of the private sector; it did not deal with the other insured people. The thrust of the reform was, first, the voluntary merger of all main and supplementary funds into a single one and, second, the creation of occupational funds based on capitalization. Apart from those structural changes, the reform included parametric changes. For example, after 2007, there will be a unified replacement rate – at 70 percent – for all employees who have entered the labour market since 1993. For persons insured in IKA (Social Security Foundation), the reference years for calculating the pension will be the best five out the last 10 years of one’s employment career (Triantafillou, 2003: Table 9; Venieris, 2003: 141). The new law on the whole modified the egalitarian tone of the aborted Giannitsis Reform (Matsaganis, 2002a: 117).

Nevertheless, owing to the introduction of funded schemes, the Reppas law can be considered a first hesitant step towards a multi-pillar pension system of the kind adopted in other EU member states. While wholesale reform is still pending, specific sectors of the pension system are changing, in accordance with wider trends in the EU. For example, the IKA fund has introduced a management information system which facilitates contacts with its clients and reduces red tape. In sum, institutional legacies are still very strong, but there is a dynamic of change, influenced by EU developments. Pension reform may proceed in a fragmentary fashion, but, given the segmented nature of the Greek pension system, such a development may be unavoidable.

Public health care

Between the foundation of the National Health System (1983) and the late 1990s there were hardly any structural changes in health care. In 1997 a law changing managerial aspects of the public health-care system was passed. The financial management of hospitals was streamlined and the managers of hospitals were to be selected on the basis of expertise rather than their political credentials. Outpatient departments of hospitals and health centres were to cooperate in order to improve first-tier health care. However, these provisions of the law were not implemented (Petmesidou, 2000: 321). First-tier public health care was not ameliorated. In the cities, the coordination of first-tier health services did not take place, as envisaged by the law (Mossialos and Davaki, forthcoming). In rural areas, many of the 170 health centres malfunction. In other words, a part of the projected reform has remained on paper.

After the re-election of Simitis in 2000, the new Minister of Health passed a law which created the Regional Health System (the Papadopoulos Reform). The country was divided into 17 regions, each of which was endowed with its own regional health authority (PESY). Managers of these authorities were given large powers to oversee the provision of health care in their district. The same law obliged medical-school professors to choose whether they would practise in private clinics (in which case they were required to resign from the university) or in (public) university hospitals (Mossialos and Davaki, forthcoming). Professors, most of whom used to practise in both, in addition to running their own private practices, staged an almost year-long strike and won the battle.

As a result of the entrenched interests of doctors, public-hospital personnel, and private businessmen, the delivery of public health care shows mixed results. Since the end of the 1990s, new hospital buildings have been built in many regions of Greece and new managers have been appointed. However, there is also a
continuation of old trends. These include a lack of competent medical personnel; misuse of funds; and degradation of facilities. In the meantime, patients who could afford to pay have turned to private health care; private diagnostic centres have mushroomed; and in some subsystems, such as maternity care, private oligopolies have arisen. Overall, the impact of the EU on health care was not strong, and institutional legacies have prevailed over attempts at reform.

Social assistance

There is a long-term interest on the part of the EU in poverty issues (e.g. the ‘Poverty’ programmes of the early 1990s, the recent NAP/incl). It comes then as no surprise that, compared to health policy, the EU’s impact has become more visible in social assistance. The last Simitis Government (2000–04) presented National Action Plans which included specific measures to fight poverty and social exclusion (Andreou and Koutsiaras, 2002: 166). The plans entailed non-contributory transfers and services to citizens in need.

However, in 2001, non-contributory benefits constituted only 16.3 percent of total spending in social security. Income-tested benefits constituted only 4.7 percent of all benefits (Matsaganis et al., 2003: 644). At the same time, the take-up of two new social assistance benefits has remained low. The first was the social security rebate promised by Simitis just before the elections of 2000: minimum-wage earners would take back from the state the share of their gross minimum wage which they paid to social insurance funds. The second measure was unemployment assistance directed to long-term unemployed persons who had low incomes and were middle-aged. Both measures were much less effective than envisaged because of very low take-up (Matsaganis et al., 2003: 644). To sum up, on paper, other important measures on social assistance were taken in the 1990s (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000: 125–6; Tsakloglou, 2000: 339). However, the application of such measures has remained variable and unpredictable.

Family and child care

The family in Southern Europe functions as a cushion to unemployment, providing unemployed family members with shelter, food and often work in the informal economy (Bermeo, 1999: 273–5). Greece is no exception to this pattern. For instance, officially unemployed family members work as unregistered workers in businesses of their families. Because of lack of adequate public nurseries, the family also provides child care. The family provides care for the elderly too: old-age pensioners in Greece are among the groups particularly hit by poverty. They cannot count on the underfunded social-care system. In the Greek family, all the above social care functions are performed by women (in the capacity of wives, daughters or grandmothers). Greek society at the beginning of the 21st century is still traditional in terms of gender roles. At the same time, new forms of family such as single-parent families and cohabitating couples have timidly appeared in large urban centres.

Some signs of change in family policy had appeared with the first post-authoritarian constitution of 1975, in which gender equality was proclaimed. In the post-authoritarian period, mothers who had four or more children were awarded a pension for life. The next policy steps were taken in the 1990s. These were the result of the demographic decline of the Greek population (Carlos and Maratou-Alipranti, 2002: 154), rather than the result of any EU influence. Allowances were awarded to unmarried mothers, while maternity leave was instituted in order to facilitate motherhood (Matsaganis, 2002b: 164–5, 184; Carlos and Maratou-Alipranti, 2002: 152).

However, today, maternity leave is comparatively short for Greek mothers (Flaquer, 2002: 54), except for those who work in the
public sector (Matsaganis, 2002b). In comparative terms, allowances for the first or the second child in Greece are among the lowest in the EU. Allowances for the third child are handed out for a brief period (until the child becomes six years old). It is only in the case of families with four or more children that Greek policy becomes generous (Matsaganis, 2002b: 175–6).

In general, Greek family policy reflects some traditional fixed ideas. The policy is biased towards the social protection of families with four or more children; it offers slim and short-term social protection to the rest of the families; it reproduces divisions between the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ of the system because most allowances are linked to occupational status; and it is characterized by a problematic infrastructure for child care (e.g. few and underfunded public nurseries).

Such long-term characteristics of Greek family policy go against the proclaimed intention of the EU and the Greek government to increase participation of women in the labour force and to make career and family obligations compatible for women. Indeed the Greek National Action Plans for Employment and Social Inclusion stress such policy preferences (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2002, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002). In sum, it seems that, owing to traditional gender relations and fixed ideas of domestic policymakers, the EU’s impact on Greek family policy is more strong in setting policy targets than in fulfilling them. In other words, institutional legacies and domestic concerns weigh over EU-driven modernization.

Structural and cohesion funds

Greece has been one of the main beneficiaries of transfers flowing from the EU’s structural and cohesion funds (Ioakimidis, 1998: 98–100; Tsoukalis, 1998: 300–2). In 1986, the country was divided into 13 regions in order to absorb the funds of Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. The programmes offered a first economic boost to some regions of Greece. After the reform of the structural funds in 1988, the country as a whole was classified in the group of ‘Objective 1’ (the less developed areas of the EEC).

The flow of structural funds in 1989–93, during the first Community Support Framework (CSF), accelerated the growth in the Greek economy in the early 1990s by 1 percent per year (Tsoukalis, 1998: 303). In the first CSF, approximately 40 percent of the funds transferred to Greece were spent on infrastructure, 21 percent on human resources, 19 percent on agriculture and 8 percent on industry. In the second CSF (1994–99), funds poured into Greece accelerated the country’s annual economic growth by 1.1 percent per year (Kazakos, 2001: 489). Around 50 percent of all CSF funds went to infrastructure, 22 percent to human resources, 15 percent to agriculture and 8 percent to industry.

Notably only 1.3 percent of the funds from the first CSF allocated to Greece and 4.4 percent of the corresponding funds of the second CSF were channelled to public health and social care (Ioakimidis, 1998: 99, Table 6). In other words, Greece spent most of the funds on infrastructure (transport and communications), a fact which reflected the country’s relatively low economic and administrative development at the time (Tsoukalis, 1998: 302). The CSFs and Community Initiatives contributed to job creation. New units of the public administration, regional authorities, private consulting companies, training centres, municipal enterprises and local cooperatives were founded in order to absorb transfers from EU structural and cohesion funds.

The EU’s structural and cohesion policies have also produced reform of vocational training. Until the appearance of the EU’s concerted effort, manifested in the two CSFs, the European Commission’s White Book of 1993, and Community Initiatives such as ‘Leonardo da Vinci’, vocational training in Greece was underfunded (Ioakimidis, 1998: 102–4). Finally, the redistributive impact EU structural...
and cohesion funds was evident among the regions of Greece. The country’s undeveloped regions witnessed a large flow of funds: in the first CSF, the EU channelled approximately €1.5b ECUs to Greece’s 13 regions; in the second CSF, the corresponding sum went up to €4.5b ECUs (Ioakimidis, 1998: 195, Table 10).

Despite the Europeanization of labour market, vocational training, regional and, to some extent, social-assistance policies, in pensions, health and family policies institutional legacies have countered pressures to reform. Some targeted and small-scale reforms have proven more successful than wholesale changes of the welfare system, which have met with increased resistance by vested interests and bureaucratic mechanisms. As a consequence, the basic structure of the Greek welfare regime today is not so different from what it used to be 30 years ago. How could we explain this resilience?

The causes of the relative Greek resilience

There are at least three answers to the above question. First, it has been argued that the problem lies in the lack of suitable advocacy coalitions which would have promoted reform (Matsaganis, 2002a: 119; Vourloumis, 2002: 74–5, 77, 110–11; Triantafillou, 2003). The resilience of traditional policies is owed to the fierce resistance of another advocacy coalition, composed of the ‘insiders’, i.e. interest groups benefiting the most from the prolongation of the inequities of the social-security system. For instance, public-sector trade unions have high organizational density, can obstruct reforms and are able to influence public opinion.

A second view, complementary to the first, blames weak state institutions for the perpetuation of reform failure (Petmesidou, 2000: 303, 324). Weakness refers to state incapacity to implement policies. For instance, in regard to the implementation of European Social Fund (ESF) programmes in the 1990s, the performance of the Greek system suffered from a lack of adequate funding and infrastructure, the unpredictability of hiring and transferring personnel, and the unsuitability of mechanisms of planning, monitoring and evaluation (Kontiadis, 1997: 141, 147–8). The implementation of the First Community Support Framework (CSF) in Greece in regard to vocational training is another case in point. There was large-scale corruption and inefficiency (Kontiadis, 1997: 141–3, 148–9; Petmesidou, 2000: 317). The Second CSF witnessed very slow absorption rates. For a time, EU-funded vocational training programmes in Greece came to a complete halt, imposed by the EU, until new, more strict rules were imposed by the end of 1998. There were frequent changes in the Ministry of Labour’s organizational chart. Finally, the Ministry has created a manageable administrative structure (a General Secretariat) able to monitor the implementation of EU programmes. Contributions-based insurance funds, however, have long suffered from the lack of personnel, computers and effective procedures of day-to-day management. The problems were related to extensive contribution evasion (Tatsos, 2001: 173).

A third view stresses the negative role played by predominant public attitudes which inhibit reform. On the basis of survey data collected in 1999, it seems that respondents were optimistic about their individual prospects as pensioners in the future. For those who belonged to the most well-endowed occupational funds, optimism may be explained by the advantages they enjoyed; for the rest, optimism may be explained by ignorance of what is at stake in pension reform (O’Donnel and Tinios, 2003: 262, 276–8; Tinios, 2003: 146–7, 207). The majority of wage-earners belong to the poorest funds, but identify with the current system, fearing that even their low benefits could be threatened by any change to it.

In our view the three approaches noted above are complementary to each other, but do not link the problem of inertia with the
political system nor do they emphasize the inhibiting role of private interests. On the one hand, for three decades now (1974–2004), the priorities of successive Greek governments laid in defence and in macro-economic stabilization. Even when it seemed that the priorities were shifted to the curbing of social inequalities, as during PASOK’s first term in power (1981–85) and again after 1996, defence spending remained high. Part of the explanation for this lies in Greek–Turkish relations, which have remained tense for most of the aforementioned period.

On the other hand, even though neither ND nor PASOK espouses welfare retrenchment, consensus over specific social-policy reforms is not forthcoming. The rhetoric of both parties over social policy has been inflammatory. Political polarization is not conducive to welfare reform. In Greece, a political culture of uncompromising views combines with a rigid bipolar party system. No wonder consensual choices about specific policy reforms are hard to obtain.

The last, but not least, cause of resilience lies in collusion between private and public interests and particularly in the reluctance of different social classes to share the cost of welfare-state reform. Contribution evasion on the part of employees of the private sector and, primarily, on the part of private businessmen, is rampant. The latter have evaded paying contributions the total of which surpasses tax evasion by employees (Tatsos, 2001: 179, comparative data on tax evasion for 1997). It is not uncommon for private employers to have deducted social insurance contributions from the wages of their employees without passing the deducted sums to the insurance funds.

To some extent, this behaviour may be explained by the comparatively high rate of contributions required of Greek employees and employers: in 1997, as far as contributions to IKA were concerned, employees contributed 15.9 percent of their gross wage and employers, for their part, another 28.2 percent (adding up to a total of 44.1 percent of gross wage; Spraos, 1997: 34–5, Table 3.4). It has been estimated that in 1997, contribution evasion in all insurance funds amounted to dr.650b (around €1.9b). In several insurance funds, contribution evasion was equal to around 30–35 percent of their total revenue from contributions (Tatsos, 2001: 173–4). Some of the public corporations, whose personnel are insured in IKA, have also largely delayed payments to this fund. Private businessmen who employ illegal immigrants avoid paying social insurance contributions for them. Many immigrants also avoid doing this for themselves.

In public health care, doctors, many of whom practise in private surgeries while also keeping their jobs in public hospitals, have no interest in substantive reform (Guillén, 2002: 57). Logically we would expect that businessmen who have invested in pharmaceutical industries, in the construction of private clinics, and in importing medical technology, share this indifference. The ‘kickbacks’, which businessmen allegedly distribute to involved parties in the public health system, must be a small cost for the size of business revenue.

The reluctance of employers to carry their share of the burden of welfare reform, by paying their dues, combines with successive Greek governments’ lack of will to exert any pressure on them. This class-biased political choice has turned welfare-state reform into a tug-of-war between a state facing a recurrent fiscal crisis and various strata of employees facing the possibility of a reduced pension.

Conclusions

In this article we have argued that after Greece joined the EEC, welfare reforms were mostly the result of domestic politics rather than European influence. The expansionist social policies of the 1980s were due to the eight-year rule of the socialist party (1981–89). In the 1990s, Greece managed to meet the Maastricht criteria without financially consolidating its pension system (Featherstone...
et al., 2001; Matsaganis, 2002a: 115). Today Greece lags behind other EU member states in transforming its pension system towards a multi-pillar model (Tinios, 2003: 18). Greece is the only country among ‘old’ member states without a minimum income guarantee (Matsaganis et al., 2003: 644). It is a country with soaring private consumption on health: private-health spending is equal to 40 percent of total health expenditure (Petmesidou, 2000: 322). At the same time its National Health System is ailing. The links between the public health system and the informal economy are extensive. Rampant corruption and mismanagement (e.g. in the procurement of infrastructure for hospitals) have continued unabated. In these respects, the evolution of the Greek welfare regime looks path-dependent: pressures to change, stemming from the EU, have not overcome institutional legacies in regard to pensions, health care and family policies. However, as we noted several times in this article, in other respects Greece is not the usual exception to the European rule anymore. At the cognitive level, there has been a major change: Greek authorities and social partners have been socialized to work in a context of programming, coordination and rationalization of social policies, the standards for which have been set in the EU and diffused in the country.

Beyond the cognitive level, the impact of the EU has been visible in Greece in selected social policy areas. These include labour markets, regional development, vocational training and, less so, social assistance. In these policy areas there has been a goodness of fit between domestic initiatives and EU policies. Also Greece has adopted an array of EU-driven policy tools and institutions of monitoring and decision making in social policy. The new mode of policy making includes, on the one hand, consultation among political authorities, representatives of interest groups, technocrats and the staff of new institutions; and, on the other hand, drafting and dissemination of opinion papers and plans for action, in which many social partners and agencies, other than the central services of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, are involved. In a unitary and only very slightly decentralized administrative system, and in a political system traditionally characterized by political polarization, all this is no mean achievement.

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