Bureaucrats and politicians: a case study of the determinants of perceptions of conflict and patronage in the Greek bureaucracy under PASOK rule, 1981–1989*

ABSTRACT

The question of whether organizational or sociopolitical determinants have an effect on the perceptions of officials in bureaucracies is addressed through an empirical study of perceptions of Greek state managers. The modern Greek bureaucracy is put in historical perspective and is presented as a case of politicized bureaucracy, ridden by party patronage. Multivariate logistic regression analysis is performed on a sample of 152 Greek top civil servants and political appointees of the PASOK party, governing in Greece in 1981 – 1989. Organizational role and political party affiliation are found to have an impact on perceptions of conflict and patronage in the bureaucracy. Organizational role is the main predictor of perceptions of consensus or conflict in intra-bureaucratic relations and political party affiliation is the main predictor of perceptions of patronage in the bureaucracy.

A long-standing, albeit somewhat unnoticed, issue in political sociology is whether organizational role or social and political origins affect the orientations of bureaucrats. On the one side of the debate there are theorists and empirical scholars of either Marxian or Weberian persuasion who believe that sociopolitical origins matter and that a purely organizational approach leaves much to be desired in understanding the behavior of bureaucrats (Lipset 1967 [1950]: 272). For those scholars social class origins (Miliband 1969: 119–29; Petras 1969: 290) or personal values (Putnam 1975: 88–9, 122) are important for the explanation of the attitudes and behavior of bureaucrats.

On the other side, those who believe that organizational role
primarily determines the behavior of bureaucrats argue that the same person behaves differently when transferred from a permanent career post to a temporary political one within the same ministry and vice versa (Suleiman 1974: 233–5). For Marxists like Poulantzas (1975: 335–7) bureaucrats will behave the same as long as they staff a capitalist state, despite the diversity of their recruitment and class affiliation. Also for some Weberians the behavior of bureaucrats can be predicted from their identification with the bureaucracy to which they belong rather than from their origins or previous system of values (LaPalombara 1964: 375–6, 388; Cleaves 1974: 5–7). An important, large-scale survey of bureaucrats and politicians in seven Western democracies (Aberbach, et al. 1981) emphasizes the interplay of political and bureaucratic roles in the contemporary European bureaucracies, viewing bureaucrats as 'equilibrators' and politicians as 'energizers' of the policy-making process. Bounded by their respective roles, politicians bring visions and conceptions to the policy process, while bureaucrats equilibrate and accommodate conflicting interests (ibid.: 92).

In this article I argue that both organizational roles and political factors (such as political party affiliation) affect the perceptions of bureaucrats and politicians, whereas social class origin does not; and that whether the one or the other of these factors becomes important largely depends on the issue at hand. In other words, the type of issues (ideological or organizational) around which state managers are polarized indicates to a certain extent who is on whose side in intra-bureaucratic squabbles taking place in politicized bureaucracies. Past research is primarily concerned with bureaucracies traditionally endowed with certain immunity to governmental changes and remains rather vague about the instances of bureaucratic behavior that may be affected either by social background or organizational role (ibid.: 155–64). By contrast I look at a heavily politicized bureaucracy and specify two concrete instances where the background or role of bureaucrats and politicians has an impact on their perceptions of intra-organizational behavior. Moreover, whereas previous research tends to consider social class origins or the value system of bureaucrats to be predictors of their behavior out of an a priori Marxist or Weberian orientation respectively, I justify my selection of predictors (such as political party affiliation) by placing the bureaucracy under study in the context of the specific society in which it is embedded, i. e. the Greek bureaucracy under populist/socialist rule in the historical perspective of state-society relations in modern Greece.

The major hypothesis of my analysis is that bureaucrats and politicians play out both organizational and sociopolitical interests in their encounters in the bureaucratic arena. This hypothesis is put to test by looking at the perceptions of a sample of Greek top civil servants and political appointees of PASOK (a populist/socialist party)
of their relations with each other and of party patronage in the Greek bureaucracy. The Greek bureaucracy is seen in the context of the intertwined development of political parties, bureaucracy and the civil society in Greece.

The Greek bureaucracy has been through different political regimes, authoritarian and democratic, since the birth of the modern Greek state in 1830. The combination of patrimonialism, associated with the long Ottoman rule over Greece, and Western liberal political institutions, imposed on the pre-liberal Greek society of the nineteenth century, has given the Greek bureaucracy functions markedly different from those of Western-European nation-states. Although the bureaucracy has been formally organized along legal-rational lines at least since the beginning of this century, it has functioned as an arena for political party factionalism and has served as a depository of surplus labor of the urban social classes (Petropoulos 1968, Legg 1969, Mouzelis 1978).

In the post-war era the bureaucracy bore the legacy of the Greek Civil War (1944–1949) and the Colonels' regime (1967–1974), being an organizational tool in the hands of the conservatives, the winners of the civil war (Mouzelis 1980; Tsoucalas 1986a). Even after the transition to democracy (1974) the conservative party of ND, which ruled in 1974–1981, used the bureaucracy as its own organizational base. Throughout the post-World-War-II period the administrative personnel was handpicked by one and the same conservative political elite in a clientelistic manner which assured the ideological homogeneity and endurance of the high public office. Greek bureaucrats were called upon to serve under a reform government of the left-of-the-center for the first time in 1981.

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), lead by Andreas Papandreou, won the general elections of October 1981 in Greece and quickly managed to occupy the bureaucracy. PASOK again won the elections of 1985 and, during its eight-year long tenure in office (1981–1989), passed more than 12 administrative laws, including legislation on new grade- and salary-scales, and procedures of recruitment and promotion in the civil service. Within its first year in power (1981–1982) the new government dismissed all the top administrative personnel, including directors general in the ministries and regional prefects (Tsekos 1986; Spourdalakis 1988; Featherstone 1990). These sweeping changes were in line with PASOK's perception of the state as a tool in the hands of the 'conservative establishment'. According to the party's pre-electoral platform the bureaucracy was in dire need of reform based on the principles of meritocracy, decentralization and democratization.

The abruptness and comprehensiveness of this reform is explained by the need of the PASOK government to reform the public administration first and foremost, in order to start implementing all
other reforms (Tsoucalas 1986b: 31). The swift move of the new PASOK government left a scar on the face of political-bureaucratic relations in the state, without getting rid of the normal tensions between bureaucrats and politicians. After the complete abolition of the post of director general (by Law 1262/1982 in February 1982), tensions were reproduced at a lower hierarchical level, that of plain directors and political appointees who had undefined jurisdictions. Resistance to the occupation of the bureaucracy by PASOK was minimal. The parties of the opposition complained in parliament, but the national labor union of public employees (ADEDY) was rather acquiescent.

PASOK's tenure in office is a telling, if not extreme, example of the pattern of party-bureaucratic relations in modern Greece: as soon as a political party decisively wins the general elections, it acquires full control over the bureaucracy and remains unchallenged in storming the ministries with its own party personnel and in formulating and passing administrative legislation in parliament. Greek political parties, while in government, show a strength disproportionate to their relatively young organizations. The Greek bureaucracy does not have a strong bureaucratic elite in the sense of European administrative elites like the French and the British ones. The bureaucracy exhibits an inability to resist alternate governments, which is only matched by the weakness of the Greek civil society. The causes for this politicization and malleability of the bureaucracy lie in the type of historical development of the state and civil society in Greece and the imbalance of organizational strength that has privileged the political parties over the bureaucracy (Sotiropoulos 1991).

DATA AND METHODS

In what follows career bureaucrats or simply bureaucrats (terms used interchangeably with 'top civil servants') are understood as professional state managers, in accordance with the 'state-centered' theories in political sociology (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985). Political appointees, in contrast to career bureaucrats, are appointed as state managers by the government’s discretion. (In this study the term 'appointees' is used interchangeably with 'politicians,' even though strictly speaking politicians stand for election before the electorate, whereas appointees do not).

In the Greece of the 1980s career bureaucrats assumed mostly line positions of middle-level management, whereas political appointees often took up staff positions. The top civil servants interviewed for this study were holding the position of director of ministry in 1989 and were appointed to that post by committees on promotions (Yperesiaka Symvoulia), whose composition had been influenced by ministers of the
PASOK government. The political appointees interviewed held high-ranking, temporary staff positions such as advisor to minister and line positions for party cadres such as secretary general of ministry, secretary special of ministry and director of the minister’s bureau.

The sample for this study consists of 152 high-ranking state officials of several ministries (Presidency of Government, National Economy, Interior, Health and Social Security), serving while the PASOK party was in power. The sample is divided into two sub-samples of equal size: one sub-sample consists of 76 top civil servants and the other of 76 PASOK political appointees.1

The conduct of standardized interviews with 76 out of 110 directors of the sampled ministries (the target population) amounted to a high 69.5 per cent response rate. So this sub-sample is almost a population. It is not possible to calculate the response rate for my second sub-sample of 76 political appointees of PASOK nor the total number of these appointees for the years 1981–1989 because PASOK ministers used to select their advisors at will out of an unspecified pool of personal friends, party cadres and sympathetic technocrats. The only way to draw the second sub-sample was using the ‘snowball technique.’2 This involved the addition of new respondents to the sample on the basis of their acquaintance with appointees I had personally known. Other researchers were denied access to PASOK cadres in the past, when they directly approached first the governing party itself (Spourdalakis 1988). I decided I would go the other way around: I first talked to technocrats (appointed by PASOK ministers in the ministries), who might or might not be PASOK party members but certainly belonged to a minister’s entourage; with their help I gradually moved to interview party members who occupied positions of either staff or line nature in the same ministries. Overall, my effort was to keep a balance among the two types of appointees, advisors to ministers and party cadres (or militants), whose differences in perceptions have been neglected by earlier research on bureaucrats and politicians.

Most of the sampled political appointees served in the same four ministries as the sampled directors and a few among them in other financial ministries. The little existing research on the background of PASOK members indicated that large numbers of young professionals (e. g. economists and engineers) were included among the party cadres (Axt 1985, Lyrintzis 1986). Young professionals also abound in my sub-sample of appointees, drawn in 1989, which is no surprise given that PASOK switched to a more pragmatic set of policies in its second term in office (1985–1989). It seems then that my sub-sample of appointees is probably representative of the target population of appointees of PASOK in 1989 in the Greek bureaucracy.
The difference in sampling techniques between the two subsamples might decrease the comparability of the group of appointees with its counterpart of civil servants, particularly since there was a high turnover of appointees. Still, that difference does not alter the fact that both groups worked in the same ministries under the uninterrupted eight-year rule of one governing party. On balance, this two-part sample should be useful and reliable.

According to my sample, the political appointee of PASOK is a young male, expert or cadre, often educated abroad, who holds an academic degree higher than the degrees of the civil servants with whom he interacts. He has studied social sciences, natural sciences or engineering. His father was a professional or an administrator and he generally comes from a background of higher social standing than the civil servants of his ministry. His first job was as an administrator or clerk and he usually believes that he belongs to the upper middle class.

In contrast, the typical top civil servant of the 1980s, who is included in my sample, is a middle-aged male, educated in a Greek university, who has majored in one of the social sciences and comes from a family living off small-scale commerce or agriculture. His first job was as a low-ranking member of the civil service and he perceives himself as a member of the lower middle class.

VARIABLES

In past studies political appointees were treated as a unified category (e.g. Suleiman 1974: 224–5, 228–9, and 236–7). By contrast, in this study there is a division of political appointees into advisors to ministers and cadres to account for the different organizational role that these fulfill in the bureaucracy. The tripartite division of the whole sample into directors, advisors and cadres is shown in two frequency tables of varying perceptions of the respondents of consensus or conflict and patronage in the interior of ministries. Then the effect of organizational and sociopolitical determinants on their perceptions is examined through the use of two multivariate logistic regression models. On the grounds of the importance of party politics for an explanation of modern Greek politics, political party affiliation is used as a determinant of the respondents' perceptions. In addition to party affiliation, social class origins, professional training and place of education represent the sociopolitical background, which is contrasted to organizational role and service in a financial or other ministry as organizational determinants of the attitudes of the interviewed officials.

In the regression analysis the perceptions of the officials are operationalized as two dependent variables: (1) perceived consensus
TABLE I: List of independent variables used to explain variation in perceptions of conflict among top civil servants and political appointees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational position</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>ADVISOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td>CADRE*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>CIVSERV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party affiliation</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>PASOK*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition parties</td>
<td>OPPOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No affiliation</td>
<td>NOPARTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial ministry</td>
<td>Official in a Financial ministry</td>
<td>MINISTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's social class</td>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td>UPPERCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>MIDCL*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower class</td>
<td>LOWCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field of studies</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>LAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social sciences and humanities</td>
<td>SOCHUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural sciences/engineering</td>
<td>NATENG*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of education</td>
<td>Only in Greece</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* These categories were excluded from the model.

in their immediate bureaucratic environment (variable name: CONSENSU); and (2) perceived politicization of the civil service under PASOK government compared to the previous ND government (variable name: POLITIC). Both are dichotomous variables and are expressed in terms of the values 0 and 1. The six independent variables seen in Table I are categorical variables: (1) organizational position in the state bureaucracy; (2) political party affiliation; (3) father's social class; (4) field of studies in the university; (5) place of education; and (6) employment in financial or non-financial ministry. (The latter two are dichotomous variables).

The first independent variable, organizational position, was composed of three dummy variables: CADRE, for PASOK's political executives like secretaries general and secretaries special who serve as administrative coordinators of sets of directorates in a ministry; ADVISOR, for advisors to ministers; and CIVSERV for directors. The excluded category was CADRE, which means that the coefficients of the former two dummy variables are to be interpreted in contrast with this excluded category.

The second independent variable, political party affiliation, was coded by three dummy variables: (1) PASOK, for card-carrying members of the governing party; (2) OPPOS, for card-carrying members of the ND party or parties of the left; and (3) NOPARTY, for respondents who said that they did not belong to any party. I grouped members of the right-wing and the left-wing parties together to emphasize the governing party vs. non-governing parties divide.
Those who did not want to reveal their party identification (21 per cent of the civil servants asked and 13 per cent of the appointees) were considered as missing data. No variable was constructed to cover them and they were excluded from the logistic regression analysis.

Father's social class, the third independent variable, was indexed by three dummies: (1) UPPERCL for upper class; (2) MIDCL for the middle classes; and (3) LOWCL for the working and the peasant classes. Assignment to class categories was made according to the most recent main profession of the respondent's father, using Giddens's schema of social class structure (1973: 107). MIDCL was excluded from the equations of the logit regression analysis.

The fourth independent variable, field of studies (i.e., major in college), was necessary to test whether legal or other training had an impact on perceptions. Research in Greece has indicated that Greek civil servants predominantly have legal training (Langrod 1965: 63, 80). The dummy variables here were (1) LAW; (2) SOCHUM, for social sciences and humanities; and (3) NATENG for natural sciences, medicine and engineering. The omitted category was NATENG.

The next independent variable was place of education (EDUCPL) which had two levels, 'educated in Greece', taking the value of 1, and 'educated abroad', taking the value of 0. Respondents who had any kind of degree from a foreign university were coded as educated abroad and the rest as educated in Greece. I assumed that foreign educated respondents have come in contact with other systems of education and administration (presumably more universalistic ones, like American and West European systems) and that this experience might guide their evaluation of the Greek bureaucracy. In addition, the introduction of this variable to the models would show if the large number of foreign educated individuals in my sample of political appointees (33 per cent) made the whole sample biased towards this category of officials.

Finally, the last independent variable to be codified was type of ministry (MINIST). This variable has two levels, 'financial ministry', taking the value of 1, and 'other ministry', taking the value of 0. Respondents of both the bureaucratic and the political camp who worked most of their time in government in the Ministries of National Economy, of Finance, of Industry, and of Agriculture were classified as employees of 'financial ministry'; the rest were assigned to the second category, 'other ministry'. I singled out respondents coming from financial ministries because these ministries are usually confronting the rest of the ministries in 'turf' battles about allocation of public funds and because their subject matter, formulation and implementation of the government's economic policy, is the testing ground for policy reform by a new governing party like PASOK.
TABLE II: Percentage distribution of perceptions of consensus among Greek top civil servants and political appointees, by organizational position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Top civil servants</th>
<th>Advisors to Minister</th>
<th>Cadres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus with some or none of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the officials of the opposite</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus with all officials</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the other side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
'Officials' is a generic term for both top civil servants and political appointees. The two 'sides' were directors and political appointees in the high echelons of ministries. The precoded question for the political appointees was 'Given that the directors are the civil servants hierarchically closest to the political heads of a ministry, are there some directors that you find easier to collaborate with in this ministry or you collaborate equally well with all of them or with (substantial) difficulty with all of them?' The same question was asked of the top civil servants substituting 'political appointees' for 'directors' and 'political heads' for 'civil servants'.

PERCEPTIONS OF CONSENSUS IN INTRA-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS

How did the two sides, top civil servants and political appointees, view their relations with each other?

As Table II shows, civil servants perceived more frequent conflict between themselves and the political appointees in their ministry than political appointees did with regard to their relations with top civil servants. Civil servants did not hesitate to openly report their dissonant, conflictive view of intra-bureaucratic relations. The overwhelming majority (75 per cent) of the 36 cadres, who were vested with decision-making power (i.e. secretaries general, secretaries special of ministries and directors of ministers' bureaus), responded that they had no problems at all in collaborating with top civil servants of their ministry, which is interpreted here as a consensual view of intra-bureaucratic relations. In contrast, only 35 per cent of the 40 interviewed advisors to ministers painted an equally harmonious image of their relations with top civil servants, whereas the rest talked of some or a lot of conflict between themselves and the top civil servants. It is worth examining whether it is only organizational role, as the frequency table suggests or also other (sociopolitical) factors which are differentially associated with perceptions of consensus or conflict in the bureaucracy. The multivariate logistic regression of
Table III is a first test for the two competing theories noted in the beginning in regard to determinants of bureaucratic perceptions.

Perception of consensus between bureaucrats and politicians is the dependent dichotomous variable regressed on the six independent categorical variables shown in Table I. As Table II shows, organizational role is statistically significant and it affects perception of consensus in the bureaucracy, controlling for all other variables. Civil servants and advisors to ministers tend not to perceive consensus in their relations with each other. Cadres, the excluded category of organizational position, perceive consensus in their relations with the other side (which in this case is civil servants). Party membership does not have any significant effect on perceptions of consensus.

Controlling for all other variables, social origin in a lower-class environment is marginally significant and it negatively affects perception of consensus in the bureaucracy. The rest of the independent variables are not statistically significant. So the most important determinant of perception of consensus in the intra-bureaucratic relations is organizational role. The phenomenon of advisors mentioning lack of consensual relations with civil servants, controlling for all other independent variables, can be accounted for by the fact that advisors play out roles attracting multiple animosities in their organizational environment. 'Line' people in the bureaucracy, regardless of their politics, regard advisors as unwelcome 'staff'; career civil
servants, again regardless of their politics, view them as intruding appointees; and politically conservative officials consider them radicals.

COMPARING PARTY PATRONAGE ACROSS TIME

On a typical day of my field research in a major ministry in downtown Athens I witnessed an episode of shadow conflict over promotions. As I was interviewing a director, another top civil servant started shouting in a neighboring office and could be clearly heard in the office in which I was conducting the interview. He was protesting in a lively fashion the recent decisions of the ministerial committee on promotions. He finally walked into the office where I was and, without paying attention to my presence, held up a flier distributed by local cadres of PASOK, which praised the meritocratic standards applied in the recent round of promotions. He was beside himself over the flier, and I heard him talking about 'the shameless tactics of the governing party to impose its will on the committee on promotions and then issue statements like this.'

In order to put the prevalence of political criteria in promotions in historical perspective, I asked the 152 sampled civil servants and political appointees to compare the governments of PASOK and ND in terms of the party patronage they exercised inside the bureaucracy, while the former was in power in 1981–1989 and the latter in 1974–1981. 6 The distribution of their responses on that question is presented in Table IV.

The relative majority of political appointees of PASOK, both cadres and advisors, believe that the use of political criteria was more extended in the civil service in the previous period (1974–1981), under the ND governments. One third of the civil servants believe that politicization in career advancement was the same in both periods. The rest of the civil servants are divided over this matter with a large number among them thinking that politicization was as extended in regard with career advancement under PASOK as under ND rule.

An important finding in Table IV is the very low percentage of the respondents who thought that political party affiliation did not matter in promotions in the civil service, not even favorably for the career of a governing party member. The majority of the officials interviewed admitted that the Greek public administration in the post-authoritarian period (1974–1989) was heavily politicized along party lines.

The relative importance of political party affiliation compared to the other factors affecting perception of politicization under different governments can be judged with the help of a multivariate logistic regression model (Table V). The dependent dichotomous variable, regressed on the usual six independent categorical variables, is 'more politicization perceived under PASOK than under ND government'.
TABLE IV: Percentage distribution of opinions of top civil servants and political appointees on the relative influence of affiliation of a civil servant with the governing political party for his or her career advancement in the Greek bureaucracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative influence</th>
<th>Top civil servants</th>
<th>Advisors to ministers</th>
<th>Cadres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant supporting ND would be promoted more in 1974–1981 under ND government</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant supporting PASOK would be promoted more in 1981–1989 under PASOK government</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant supporting the governing party would be promoted the same in both periods</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career of civil servant would not be affected at all by party affiliation in either period</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. The pre-coded question was 'In practice, do you think that the career of a civil servant in this ministry would have been promoted the same, if that civil servant was a member of the governing political party in the years 1974–1981 (of ND, when it was in power) or of the other party (of PASOK, when it was in power) in 1981–1989?'

Table V exhibits significant positive effects of being a member of an opposition party and not being a member of any party on the perception of more ample use of patronage in the bureaucracy in the times of PASOK than in the times of ND in government. Again here these effects are in contrast to cadres. The other independent variables were not statistically significant.

PASOK party members tended to think that ND governments exercised more political patronage in the bureaucracy when they were in power in 1974–1981 than PASOK did when its turn came to rule in 1981–1989; in sharp contrast, members of the parties of the opposition (ND and parties of the Left) and unaffiliated officials, controlling for all other five attributes, were likely to believe PASOK exercised more political patronage in the 1980s than ND did in the 1970s.

This phenomenon of strong effect of political party affiliation on perceptions of relative patronage is due to the political nature of the question posed, which called for a comparison of the histories of two
successive governments by the respondents. Moreover, it is in the exclusionary nature of party patronage to draw a line between those who have access to public employment and higher career advancement and those who are excluded from either of these opportunities. Under party patronage the former are members or voters of the governing party, whereas the latter are of the opposition or unaffiliated with either side. In this tradition it is not surprising that members of one party would blame the other for more patronage while in power compared to the practice of their own party.

At any rate, in this second model bureaucrats were not grouped together on the one side of the perceptual divide nor were political appointees unanimously thinking differently from bureaucrats. Organizational role did not matter so much in determining perceptions of relative politicization. Instead, political party affiliation cut through the whole sample, pitting PASOK party members against the rest, which is a finding that may be attributed to PASOK’s mode of ‘penetration’ of bureaucracy.

Although the structural impact of PASOK’s ascent to power on the organization of bureaucracy was significant, one cannot help concluding that patronage survived in a different context. Under PASOK, party patronage took the form of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’, i.e. patronage exercised in an organized fashion by a collective patron such as a political party in office (Lyrintzis 1984). PASOK party
members and voters used to approach their local party organization to look for a job in the public sector and their demands were processed through the party apparatus. Under ND, which before 1981 was a party of ‘notables’ with an inchoate organization, patronage was exercised on a more or less personal basis by local party ‘barons’ and individual ministers, who selected potential new civil servants among their own clientele. In this sense party affiliation became much more important under PASOK rule than it used to be before 1981. The Greek bureaucracy, politicized by the conservatives to an astonishing degree throughout the post-war era, now became ‘party politicized’.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the ideological battle lines between bureaucrats and politicians are not always drawn on the grounds of their corresponding organizational roles in the state bureaucracy. This finding was assumed by other researchers of Western bureaucracies, although no more than circumstantial evidence was given to substantiate it (e.g. in Aberbach, et al. 1981: 252). In this article I attempted to establish the perceptual lines dividing the state managers, beyond the common organizational cleavage between career bureaucrats and politicians.

Through evidence from interviews and the use of two logit models I sought to show that on some purely political issues, such as the politicization of the civil service under alternating governing parties, the divide is between members and non-members of the governing party. Being a member of the governing party has a negative effect on perceptions of relative politicization under the rule of this party compared to the major party of the opposition, which was previously in power. Being a member of the opposition parties has the reverse effect: the rule of the governing party is considered more politicized compared to that of the major party of the opposition in an earlier period.

The party politicization of the bureaucracy, however, does not bring about a ‘war of all against all’ on exclusively ideological grounds. On certain organizational issues, such as perceptions of intra-bureaucratic conflict or consensus, organizational role affects orientations of bureaucrats and politicians. Assuming an organizational role with unclear boundaries but, nevertheless, with access to centers of decision-making, such as the position of minister’s advisor, has a strong negative effect on perceiving consensus in the ministry. The same holds for the effect of playing a role with clear boundaries but no access to decision-making power, such as the position of director of ministry. However, having a role which involves decision-making, i.e. being a cadre, has a positive effect on perception of consensus in the ministry. By contrast, social class, field of studies, place of the university education of officials and the type of ministry (financial or
Bureaucrats and politicians

not) in which they serve do not affect their perceptions of conflict and patronage in the bureaucracy.

The study of the case of Greece emphasizes political factors which are important, though less pronounced, in bureaucracies of other modern democracies. The increasing fusion of political and administrative roles in the high echelons of the bureaucracy is well established by past research (Aberbach, et al. 1981). Both bureaucrats and politicians participate in policy-making, entailing complex issues highly sensitive to professional, social and political biases. Therefore I would suggest that, to the degree that a bureaucracy is permeated by party politics, political affiliation of bureaucrats and political appointees should be taken into account in a varying mix with organizational cleavages to explain intra-organizational conflict. More research along these lines could map intra-bureaucratic cleavages of opinion and test this claim in other bureaucracies.

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NOTES

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1. In the beginning of my field research, which took place in 1989, I personally contacted all 110 directors of the Ministries of the Presidency of Government, of National Economy, of Interior, and of Health and Social Security and asked them to grant me interviews. I chose these four particular ministries because they constitute part of the core of the Greek state bureaucracy; they are among the ministries over which any newly elected governing party would like to take control; their top personnel were not very large in numbers nor dispersed in terms of office location; and because of my existing connections, established in earlier visits to Athens, access to these ministries was easier than to others.

2. Using this 'snowball' technique I managed to interview 76 political appointees. Despite my efforts to increase the number of interviews with such people, it proved to be impossible to enlarge that sub-sample. This was due to constraints of time on my work and particularly due to the insecure fate of the declining PASOK party which lost both of the two Greek general elections in June 1989 and in November 1989.

3. Advisors to ministers officially have only 'staff' duties, whereas cadres, like secretaries general and secretaries special of ministries, hold executive positions of 'line'.

4. I used the SAS statistical package to calculate the coefficients and chi-square of the two models.

5. The classification of occupations was based on Giddens (1973: 107) and it has been adapted to contemporary Greece by Lambiri-Dimaki (1983: 229).
assigned the status of middle class to border line cases of father's occupation because the self-employed strata in Greece (excluding owners of large business enterprises) still constitute a startling percentage of the labor force (over 30 per cent); and because the dominant thesis in contemporary Greek sociology (Tsoucalas 1986a: 171 ff.) asserts the existence of large social strata with multiple-employment (e. g. a civil servant working as an accountant in a ministry in the mornings and a free-lance tax consultant in the evenings). So, for example, if the respondent's father was a low-ranking salaried employee, I assigned the respondent to the category MID(L (middle class). I did the same for respondents whose fathers were small shopkeepers.

6. Patronage is understood here as an informal, instrumental, reciprocal, asymmetrical, unequal and often coercive bond between a patron (e. g. a minister) and a client (e. g. a civil servant). For recent relevant studies on Greece see Mavrogordatos (1983a), Lyrintzis (1984), and Kourvertaris and Dobratz (1984)

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